On average, 40 percent of US corporations with foreign source income are not taxable because they are in loss, and annually these loss fi rms are responsible for about 13 percent of foreign source dividend repatriations. Yet the repatriation behavior of these US parents in loss has largely been overlooked, both in policy analysis and in the economic literature. This study uses a balanced panel of US income tax returns from 1998 to 2002 in order to examine the repatriation behavior of US parents in loss. The panel data allows us to relate the repatriation behavior of individual US parents to their income status. The paper demonstrates that the unique incentives facing fi rms in loss years can cause the repatriation behavior in loss years to differ systematically from repatriation behavior in income years. As a result of this fi nding, it may be prudent for those who analyze dividend repatriation to incorporate the unique incentives facing US parents in loss in order to improve the accuracy of empirical estimates of the effects of taxes on repatriation.
INTRODUCTION
O n average 40 percent of US corporations with foreign source income are not taxable because they are in loss, and annually these loss fi rms are responsible for about 13 percent of foreign source dividend repatriations. 1 Yet the repatriation behavior of these US parents in loss has largely been overlooked, both in policy analysis and in the economic literature. This paper begins to address this oversight by carefully describing the repatriation incentives and behavior of loss fi rms. In doing so, we are expanding the preliminary analysis of the repatriation behavior of loss fi rms put forth by Altshuler and Newlon (1993) (hereafter A&N).
The main goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of how loss status impacts dividend repatriations. This study is unique in that it uses a balanced panel of US income tax returns from 1998 to 2002 in order to examine the repatriation behavior of US parents in loss. 2 The panel data allows us to relate the repatriation behavior of individual US parents to
The Foreign Source Income Repatriation Patterns of US Parents in Worldwide Loss* their income status. Firms in loss generally repatriate less foreign source income than fi rms with taxable income. This is true even though fi rms in loss may be able to repatriate foreign source income with no "residual" US tax and, thus, a zero "tax price." 3 The panel is used to determine whether the lower repatriation by loss fi rms is only prevalent for "chronic loss fi rms" or if it also pertains to a loss year for fi rms that are occasionally in loss. The former would suggest consistent repatriation behavior across income and loss states but systematic differences across US parents, while the latter would suggest systematic differences in repatriation for a given parent across its income and loss experiences.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews the importance of repatriations of US parents in loss in the context of empirical international tax research and policy analysis, and attempts to characterize the tax incentives facing loss fi rms. The third section describes the data sets used for this analysis. The fourth section provides an initial data analysis of the repatriation behavior of loss fi rms and describes limitations of the study, and the fi fth section offers preliminary conclusions.
IMPORTANCE OF REPATRIATION OF LOSS FIRMS
Repatriated foreign source dividends are a key component of foreign source income, comprising about 55 percent of repatriated earnings in any given year, and have been of great interest to researchers and policy makers alike. 4 Because US parents can generally choose the level and timing of repatriations from their foreign subsidiaries, researchers have focused on the relationship between dividend repatriation and taxes, and have tried to ascertain if taxes affect dividend repatriation behavior. Because dividend repatriations are a key source of foreign tax credit usage, policy makers and revenue estimators are concerned with the precise level of repatriated dividends (as well as other foreign source income and foreign tax payments) so that accurate estimates of foreign tax credit usage in current law and under alternative policy scenarios can be determined. However, in both the research and policy arenas, the foreign source income repatriations of US parents in loss have largely been ignored. In this section we will highlight why the repatriations of loss fi rms are important and place this information in the context of the existing literature and analysis.
The "new view" analysis of the relationship between taxes and foreign source income repatriation has a 20 year history. 5 Hartman (1985) asserts that in theory repatriation taxes on foreign source income-if constant over time -should not affect the dividend payout decisions from a mature controlled for-3 US tax policy is to tax worldwide income at the US statutory rate of 35 percent, but to provide a credit for any taxes paid abroad up to the US rate of 35 percent. Thus, if a parent repatriates from a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) located in a jurisdiction with a statutory rate less than the US tax rate, the US parent must pay the difference between the foreign statutory rate and the US statutory rate on that repatriated income. This US tax is termed the residual US tax. If the US parent repatriates from a jurisdiction with a statutory rate higher than the US statutory rate, then no additional US tax is due, and the parent receives foreign tax credits equal to total foreign taxes paid, which he can then use to offset US tax on other foreign source income. Foreign taxes paid depend on both the foreign tax rate and the foreign tax base, which may differ from the US tax base. Finally, we note that the tax price in this context is defi ned as the additional tax liability arising from an incremental dollar's worth of foreign income remittance. Since a loss corporation pays no current year taxes, their current year tax price is equal to zero. See A&N for a more complete discussion. 4 Altshuler and Newlon (1993) . Further, as can be inferred from Table 5 , rents and royalties comprise about 34 percent of total repatriations, while interest comprises the remaining 11 percent. 5 The new view asserts that if taxes on dividends are constant over time, they should not distort the real decisions of domestic corporations. See Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1995) . eign corporation (CFC) to its US parent and, in his model, should not affect the investment made by the subsidiary out of its retained earnings. 6 However, several microeconomic studies (Goodspeed and Frisch, 1989; Hines and Hubbard, 1990; Altshuler and Newlon, 1993) have tested the relationship and found negative correlations between taxes and repatriations in practice. 7 Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1995) reconcile the theory with the empirical findings by demonstrating that in practice the repatriation tax price facing individual fi rms varies over time due to changes in the fi rms' foreign tax credit positions, and it is these transitory components of the tax price that are negatively correlated with dividend repatriations. That is, when a US parent faces a "residual" US tax on its repatriated foreign earnings, the "tax price" is higher and the parent is less likely to repatriate. Foreign tax credit position refers to the relationship between US tax liability on foreign source income and the foreign tax credits available to offset that liability. A corporation whose US tax liability on foreign source income exceeds its supply of foreign tax credits is said to be "in excess limit," while a US corporation whose foreign tax credit sup-ply exceeds its US tax liability on foreign source income is said to be "in excess credit."
The Hartman and Sinn model generalizes the original Hartman model to allow for multiple modes of income repatriation and demonstrates that the tax price of the lowest cost option does not affect investment out of retained earnings. 8 Grubert (1998) extends all previous work and provides loose support for the Hartman and Sinn model by analyzing repatriation incentives and behavior in a world in which there are multiple repatriation vehicles, and fi nds that taxes have a large and signifi cant effect on the composition of repatriations. 9 Finally, Grubert (1998, 2001 ) perform theoretical and empirical analyses that consider more sophisticated repatriation alternatives, and again fi nd evidence that taxes impact repatriation behavior. Thus, accurately understanding the relationship between taxes and foreign source income repatriations is important for many reasons. 10 A&N perform the only separate analysis of loss fi rms to date using a 1984 cross section for a limited subset of US parents in loss. 11 They describe the apparent paradox that these loss fi rms appear somewhat less likely to repatriate dividends than 6 A controlled foreign corporation (CFC) is a foreign subsidiary of one or several US persons who own at least 50 percent of that foreign corporation. The CFC pays taxes in the foreign jurisdiction and remits income to its US parent in the form of dividends, interest, rents, royalties. 7 These studies do not appear to screen on the age of the CFC, and are, thus, not necessarily limited to mature CFCs. However, data sampling criteria probably dictate that most CFCs included in these studies and our own study are mature. See Altshuler and Newlon (1993) and Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1995) for clear, concise, and complete descriptions of previous studies. 8 The model is presented by Sinn (1993) . 9 Grubert includes repatriations by US parents in worldwide loss in his analysis, though as his focus is on alternative repatriation vehicles he does not fully model the unique incentives or separately report the results for US parents in loss. 10 Though the research discussed herein makes clear the importance of analyzing all forms of foreign source income repatriation, data restrictions and time limitations have constrained us to look only at dividend repatriations. See the fourth section for a brief discussion of the other foreign source income repatriations of US parents in loss. Future work will hopefully include more in depth analysis. 11 A&N include only those loss fi rms that voluntarily chose to fi le the tax information in support of a foreign tax credit even though they are unable to claim a foreign tax credit. Currently, these voluntary fi lings account for about half of the dividends of loss parents (see the third section for further details). Also, note that, with respect to loss corporations, the 1984 cross section is somewhat distinct in that it followed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA 1981) , which resulted in an unusually large number of corporations being in loss. their taxable counterparts. 12 This is a paradox because in principle loss parents face increased repatriation incentives because the fact that they are in loss means that they can temporarily avoid the "residual" US tax that normally accrues on dividends repatriated from a low tax jurisdiction. A&N postulate that the net operating loss deductions (NOLDs), which these parents must forego in order to repatriate dividends, are more valuable to them than the delayed residual tax payments and the extra foreign tax credits (FTC), which would accrue as a result of the repatriation. 13 A&N go on to mention that NOLDs could be more valuable because their carryover period is longer than the FTC carryover period. We note further that NOLDs can be used to offset tax liability on US source income, whereas foreign tax credits can only offset liability on foreign source income, and, as long as the corporation has positive income in one of the two prior years, it can be carried back for an immediate tax refund. 14 By contrast, foreign tax credit usage can be quite restricted under current law due to the existence of nine different "baskets," each of which has separate FTC usage restrictions with special loss allocation rules across those baskets. In any case, if the dividend repatriation behavior of US parents in loss is systematically different than parents with income, then the formal analysis of the relationship between taxes and repatriation perhaps ought to be expanded to include the unique incentive facing US parents in loss. 15 Though this might not change the conclusions, it could improve the accuracy of the empirical estimates and remove any existing bias in the estimates in the studies that omit US parents in loss. 16 In this study we examine the relationship between dividend repatriation and loss status using more complete panel data than was used by A&N. By doing so, we hope to determine whether the apparent bias against "loss repatriation" is pervasive, if it exists over time, and whether it exists for all fi rms or only a subset of fi rms.
DATA SOURCES AND ISSUES
The sources of information concerning foreign source income for corporations used in this paper are the US corporate tax return (Form 1120) and the information 12 They also describe that they are less likely to repatriate from low-tax jurisdictions than their taxable counterparts, and that US parents in loss are more likely to repatriate from CFCs in high-tax jurisdictions (i.e., jurisdictions with statutory rates higher than the US statutory rate) than they are from low-tax jurisdictions. They did not offer an explanation for this latter paradox. 13 See A&N for additional explanation and detail. 14 Legislation in 2004 lengthened the carryforward period for FTC from fi ve years to ten years, though it reduced the carryback period from two years to one year. The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (TRA 97) changed the NOLD carryback period to two years (from its previous level of three years) and lengthened the carryforward period to 20 years (from its previous level of 15 years). However, The Job Creation Act of 2002 extended the carryback period to fi ve years for tax years 2001 and 2002 only. This temporary increase in the NOLD carryback period during our sample period creates some increased incentives for choosing NOLDs over FTCs during the last two years of our sample period, relative to A&N. However, A&N's analysis was of 1984 data when the FTC carryback and carryforward periods were two years and fi ve years and the NOLD carryback and carryforward periods were three years and 15 years. 15 Loss fi rms are also unique in that their expectation of the tax price might differ signifi cantly from an income fi rm. For example, a fi rm could typically be an excess limit fi rm but, if it repatriates in a year of loss it would temporarily become an excess credit fi rm. 16 The tax price of dividend repatriations used in the literature does extend to loss fi rms in the sense that loss fi rms are technically fi rms with foreign taxes that cannot be used as credits or excess credit fi rms, but as discussed above loss fi rms are unique in facing a potential incentive to obtain a NOLD rather than repatriate income. See A&N for tax price specifi cation. return fi led by each controlled foreign corporation (CFC) (Form 5471) of a US parent. Form 1120, Schedule C, contains separate information on voluntary dividend repatriations and "deemed" dividend repatriations from foreign sources, but combines other forms of foreign source income such as interest, royalties or branch income with domestic source income. 17 Form 1120 also reports total foreign tax credits used in any given year. Form 5471 is fi led by a US parent for each CFC and contains the most comprehensive, detailed information on foreign source income of CFCs including the subsidiaries' earnings and profi ts, dividend, interest, rent and royalty repatriations to its US parent, and other information. However, complete information (including the items mentioned above) is only edited for the top 7,500 subsidiaries in even years. There is a surprising amount of turnover in top 7,500 subsidiaries so that less than half of the CFCs remain in the top 7,500 over a six year time window. Finally, Form 5471 only contains information on repatriations of related parties.
Our analysis is based on a balanced panel taken from the statistics of income random samples of Forms 1120 for each year from 1998 through 2004. 18 The crite-ria for inclusion in the panel are that the corporation be in the sample in every year and that the corporation have at least one year in which there is a positive dividend repatriation within the seven year period. 19 We exclude corporations in the fi nance industry and partial year returns. 20 This results in a panel of 1,830 distinct US corporations, all of which own at least one foreign subsidiary. 21 The balanced panel, which includes all US parents in loss that meet the panel criteria, is seven years long, allowing a long-enough period for more than 60 percent of the fi rms to switch between income and loss states. A&N were only able to analyze a smaller subset of fi rms in loss because they use data from the form fi led in support of a foreign tax credit (Form 1118). Firms in loss cannot claim a foreign tax credit and so only those loss fi rms that voluntarily fi led Form 1118 were included in their study. Because these data have no current year tax consequences, their quality is not known.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We now consider the repatriation behavior of loss fi rms, where a loss fi rm is defi ned as a fi rm with negative net income prior to any foreign source dividend repa-17 Under US tax law, most foreign source income is not taxable until it is repatriated, but Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code outlines an exception to this rule. Certain types of passive and related party foreign source income (so-called subpart F income) are taxed when earned, even if they are not repatriated. Taxable subpart F foreign source income appears on Form 1120 as a "deemed" dividend. 18 Since 5471s are only edited in even years and only edited completely for the top 7,500 fi rms, and since turnover of the top 7,500 is so great, including the 5471 data-while adding additional information such as foreign jurisdiction tax rates-would severely restrict the panel. 19 In the Statistics of Income (SOI) stratifi ed sample for corporations, many fi rms are selected with certainty and are, therefore, available every year. For fi rms in non-certainty stratum, the sample selection process is set up in such a manner that any corporation selected into the sample in a given year will be selected again the next year, providing that the corporation fi les a return using the same employer identifi cation number (EIN) in the two years and that it falls into a stratum with the same or higher sampling rate. 20 Corporations in the fi nance industry are excluded from the panel because they tend to structure their foreign operations in branch form and tend to have a different repatriation structure than nonfi nancial corporations. 21 There are just over 39,000 nonfi nancial corporations present in each of the seven years, but most of these do not have any positive dividend repatriations over the period and, thus, are uninteresting for the purpose of this study. Table 2 presents fi rm-level tabulations concerning the US parents in our balanced panel. It organizes information concerning the US parents in the panel by the number of years they spent in loss (i.e., their "Loss Year Group"). Panel A simply reports the number of times each parent is in a loss status over the seven year panel. A full 37 percent of these US parents are never in a loss status over the period, while a modest four percent of the sample is in loss in every one of the seven years. The remaining 60 percent of the sample moves between income and loss over the sample period, with more of the parents tending toward fewer years of loss. This demonstrates that the decision as to whether or 22 For most fi rms, this is the same as defi ning a loss fi rm using negative net income reported on the corporation's tax return. But there are 116 fi rms whose dividend repatriations move them from negative total net income to positive total net income. Some of these companies have large loss year repatriations. We want to consider their repatriation behavior given their income versus loss position before the impact of the repatriation itself. not to repatriate in a loss year is relevant for a substantial portion of the US parents with foreign source income over the relevant time period.
What is the dividend repatriation behavior of these various groups? Panel B in Table 2 shows that about 60 percent of total dividends are repatriated by US parents that are never in loss. But the remaining 40 percent are repatriated by parents that are in loss in at least some years of the panel and, thus, the majority of US parents and a signifi cant portion of the dividend repatriations themselves could be timed so as to take advantage of the relief from residual US tax that arises due to loss status. Panel C in Table 2 reports the average number of years that there are positive dividend repatriations by the number of years the parent is in loss. Notice that, on average, parents repatriate dividends in about half of the years (so dividend repatriations are zero in the other half of the years). Further, the less often the parent is in loss, the more frequently he tends to repatriate dividends-parents that are never in loss repatriate dividends in about four of the seven years, while parents that are always in loss repatriate dividends in about two of the seven years. Table 3 highlights the fact that individual parents appear much more likely to repatriate dividends in an income year than in a loss year. The rows of Table  3 group the firms in the panel by the number of years in which they repatriate dividends. Panel A presents counts of the number of years in which US parents with income repatriate dividends, while panel B presents those counts for US parents in loss. Note that the decision not to repatriate (the "No Years" line in Panels A and B) is much more prevalent when the fi rm is in a loss year (55 percent) than when the fi rm is in an income year (15 percent), and while almost 60 percent of parents have two or more income year repatriations and 42 percent have three or more income year repatriations, only 21 percent have two or more "loss year repatriations" and 10 percent have three or more loss year repatriations. In short, in terms of the zero-one choice to repatriate dividends, parents apparently prefer to repatriate dividends in a year in which they have income.
Is this behavior dependent upon how often the parent is in loss? Are the dollar amounts repatriated in loss years dependent upon how often the parent is in loss? Table 4, like Table 2 , organizes information about US parents by the number of years they spend in loss (or "loss year groups"), but reports additional information about dividend repatriations. Column 1 in Table 4 reports the overall mean dividend repatriation of each loss year group measured relative to the total asset size of the corporation, while columns 2 and 3 separate these overall means into the mean for income year repatriations and the mean for loss year repatriations. 23 23 It is likely that larger US parents repatriate more dividends. If larger parents are less frequently in loss, than this correlation between asset size and loss status could cause the mean income year dividend repatriation to exceed the mean loss year dividend repatriation. To prevent this spurious result, we measure the mean dividend repatriation relative to total assets. Column 4 shows mean assets for the loss year group. Column 5 reports total dividend repatriations, and columns 6 and 7 show repatriations by income and loss years, respectively. Column 8 divides column 7 by fi ve to show the percentage of total dividends repatriated in a loss year.
The following analysis is based mostly on columns 1 through 3, while columns 4 through 8 provide the information that underlies the calculation of the fi rst three columns. Panel A in Table 4 reports information for the full balanced panel. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Panel A demonstrates that for fi rms rarely in loss (loss year groups one through three), the mean dividend repatriation relative to assets tends to be a little larger in income years than in loss years, while the reverse is true for fi rms more frequently in loss (loss year groups four through six). But, overall, there does not appear to be any difference in the mean repatriations across income and loss years.
As shown in Table 3 , companies repatriate much more frequently in income years than in loss years, and, as shown in Table  1 , income year repatriations are substantially larger than loss year repatriations. By contrast, Panel A in Table 4 shows that mean loss year repatriations are similar to mean income year repatriations. One possible reason for this apparent contradiction is that a relatively small group of firms make fairly sizable loss year repatriations. Panel B in Table 4 reports the dividend repatriation information for the 115 largest loss year repatriators. We defi ne a "large loss year repatriator" to be a fi rm whose average loss year dividend repatriation (measured relative to assets) is in the top ten percent of all loss year repatriations. There are 115 such fi rms, which comprise six percent of the balanced panel. 24 Comparing column 2 to column 3 in Panel B shows that the mean dividend repatriation relative to assets is smaller in income years than in loss years, and this is particularly true for companies frequently in loss. Overall, the mean loss year repatriation is statistically signifi cantly larger than the mean income year repatriation at the 0.001 percent level. 25 Column 8 shows that these 115 fi rms tend to repatriate a large portion of their total dividends in loss years, with overall loss year repatriations accounting for almost 64 percent of total repatriations. Panel C in Table 4 reports the additional dividend information for all companies in the balanced panel other than the large loss year repatriators. Recall that these firms comprise 94 percent of the total sample. Comparing columns 2 and 3 of Panel C demonstrates that most firms in the sample have substantially larger mean dividend repatriations relative to assets in income years than in loss years, and this is true regardless of their loss year group. 26, 27 The overall means and 24 In future analysis we hope to be able to say more about the general characteristics of these large loss repatriators. However, until we can match their repatriation information with their foreign tax credit position and information of the foreign corporations which they control, we cannot fully characterize these companies. 25 Most of the means for the individual loss year groups were not statistically distinct, which we attribute to the very small sample size. 26 The corporate alternative minimum tax also has some impact on the incentive to repatriate. We do not examine that impact in this paper. In the years of our panel, the amount of alternative minimum tax paid by corporations is relatively small, but it could impact the behavior of specifi c fi rms. See Lyon and Silverstein (1995) for an analysis of the impact of the alternative minimum tax on the incentive for corporations to repatriate. 27 One subgroup of parents in loss that have an immediate incentive to keep their NOLD as high as possible and, thus, keep repatriations low are those parents that had income in the year previous to the loss year. The NOLD of such parents could be used to generate a refund that would be almost immediately available to the parent. A comparison of that subgroup with the parents that did not have an income year in the year previous to the loss year reveals that fi rms frequently in loss who can obtain an immediate carryback refund repatriate the mean of each loss year group are statistically signifi cantly different. Column 8 demonstrates that these fi rms generally repatriate a relatively modest portion of their total dividends in loss years, with the overall loss year repatriations comprising about seven percent of their total repatriations. 28 These results clearly highlight the fact that companies face unique incentives when they are in loss. Not surprisingly, it appears that different companies respond differently to these unique incentives. A small subset of fi rms appears to take advantage of the avoidance of residual tax by repatriating substantial amounts in loss years. However, the majority of fi rms appear to maximize their NOLD by both avoiding loss year repatriations and on average repatriating smaller amounts in loss years. Thus, for most fi rms, the evidence using the seven year panel data set of loss fi rms lends support to A&N's preliminary conclusion that most US parents repatriate fewer dividends in loss years.
As mentioned above, there are multiple methods of repatriating foreign source income and, as highlighted by the Hartman and Sinn model and Grubert (1998), the existence of multiple methods impacts the relationship between taxes and foreign source income repatriations both theoretically and empirically. US parents in loss have the incentive to structure repatriations in alternative forms such as royalties or interest, which are deductible in the foreign jurisdiction and, thus, carry only limited foreign taxes and receive the maximum benefit of avoiding US residual tax.
It is possible that loss year status affects only the composition of foreign source income repatriations, so that there would be no systematic difference in the total foreign source income repatriations of income versus loss fi rms. Unfortunately, we cannot readily test this hypothesis at the fi rm level. 29 However, Table 5 presents aggregate tabulations of rent, interest, and dividend repatriations for 1998, 2000, and 2002 broken out by income versus loss status, from the CFC information returns (Form 5471). Note that, in this table, in order to keep the comparison groups constant, loss status is defi ned as negative net income reported on the corporations' income tax return, rather than net income prior to the repatriation of each form of foreign source income.
Interest repatriations of US parents in loss range between 16 and 28 percent of total repatriations, while they average about ten percent for US parents with income. However, rents show no consistent pattern in relation to loss status. In summary, the aggregate data provide some evidence that loss parents could repatriate income in forms that minimize accumulation of excess credits and maximize aversion of immediate US tax. However, without performing analysis at the fi rm level it is not possible to fully understand these aggregate repatriation patterns, but they do seem to suggest that a more complete analysis of the behavior of loss firms with respect to all forms of foreign source income repatriation is warranted.
CONCLUSION
The results presented in this paper use a large seven year balanced panel to demonstrate that the loss year repatriation behavior of US parents refl ects the unique signifi cantly less in that loss year than fi rms frequently in loss that cannot obtain an immediate refund. But this is not the case for fi rms infrequently in loss; that is, fi rms infrequently in loss repatriate the same in loss years regardless of the potential to carryback. 28 If we compute the percentage of total repatriations in loss years excluding repatriations made by companies never in loss, the loss year repatriations make up about 20 percent of total repatriations. 29 This would require a panel of CFC-parent data, which would result in a more restricted sample. tax incentives facing US parents when they are in loss. A small subset of fi rms appears to use the opportunity of being in loss to repatriate dividends without residual US tax, while the majority of fi rms tend to avoid repatriating foreign source dividends when they are in loss and repatriate smaller amounts when they are in loss. Therefore, the behavior of the majority of fi rms is consistent with the original A&N hypothesis that fi rms prefer NOLDs to excess foreign tax credits. 30 We hypothesize that this is because NOLDs can be used to offset US tax liability for both domestic and foreign source income and NOLDS have a longer carryover period than foreign tax credits. We further hypothesize that these results are consistent with the ability of US parents to use cross crediting across high-and low-tax jurisdictions to minimize their overall taxes. 31 If parents are easily able to cross credit, then their incentive to take advantage of the lack of US residual tax in loss years is greatly reduced. Further analysis of US parents in loss using linked 5471 and 1120 data will hopefully shed light on such issues.
These fi ndings are consistent with the existing research concerning taxes and dividend repatriations. If parents respond to the unique incentives facing them in loss years either by choosing not to repatriate in loss years because NOLDs are "more valuable" or by repatriating in loss years so as to avoid residual US tax, then companies do in fact time dividend repatriations to take advantage of temporary tax price fl uctuations. In summary, we demonstrate that the unique incentives 30 Analysis of the credit position of parents suggest that many parents and most of the dollars of foreign source income repatriations are in a position of "excess credit," and that many of them stay in excess credit for many years. These facts could suggest that the likelihood of FTCs expiring is greater than the likelihood of NOLDs expiring, even for parents not frequently in loss. 31 A&N provide evidence of cross crediting for taxable US parents. facing fi rms in loss years can cause the repatriation behavior in loss years to differ systematically from repatriation behavior in income years. As a result of this fi nding, it may be prudent to expand the analysis of dividend repatriation to incorporate the unique incentives facing US parents in loss in order to improve the accuracy of empirical estimates of the effects of taxes on repatriation.
